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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
This paper was presented at the conference on "Regulatory 
Reform and the Completion of the Internal Market" organised by the 






















































































































































































Regulation and deregulation are key-words in the current economic 
discussion about the role of governments in market-oriented 
economies such as the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter 
"Germany"). Economic sectors with a high degree of governmental 
intervention and regulation are the health care, 
telecommunications, banking and financial markets, agriculture, 
transportation, the building industry, craft, energy and last but 
not least the insurance industry. Some of the regulations in those 
markets have a long tradition, like the guilds and the trade and 
craftmen chambers which are still boddies of public law in 
Germany.
Other regulations were taken in difficult times and during the 
Second World War. For instance, German office-based physicians 
have to be member of a physician-association, which is also a body 
of public law, if they want to treat patients covered by sickness 
funds. That is 92 percent of the population. These associations 
control fees, set limits on the quantities of services and 
patients treated and control the service production of office- 
based physicians. The formation of physician cartell was initiated 
by an emergency degree of chancellor Briining in 1932 some month 
before Hitler came into power. At that time the physicians tried 
to use the physician shortage for increasing their fees and they 
prepared themselves for a strike. The overall critical economic 
situation forced the government to react with tough regulations. 
However, one might ask if those measures are still appropriate in 
a time of physician surplus and economic prosperity. Because the 
positive effects of these regulations are unclear but the economic 
cost of excessive physician fees and barriers to entry for young 
doctors are obvious economists demand for deregulatory measures in 
medical care.
The same is true for the insurance industry:1 Economists raised 
the question whether regulatory measures are still (or at all) 
justified which were imposed in 1901, when the first Insurance 
Regulation Law (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) was promulgated.





























































































This paper provides a description of the German insurance industry 
and the major regulatory measures in part 1 and 2. In part 3 some 
consequences of the current insurance regulation in Germany are 
discussed. Fortunately or unfortunately (it depends on the point 
of view) no major deregulatory measures habe been taken during the 
past few years. However, the harmonization of the European Market 
will increase competition among insurance companies and will force 
some degree of deregulation of insurance markets. This topic is 
discussed in part 4.
I. The Insurance Industry in Germany
The insurance industry in Germany is not only a highly regulated 
sector but also a fast growing sector. Table 1 provides some 
general information and a global idea of the growth of the 
insurance industry increased by more than 1200 % while the gross 
national product increased only by 550 %. German insurance 
companies realize as much gross revenues as the three leading 
automobile companies Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz and BMW together.
The largest part of the revenues is going to indemnity and 
accident insurance followed by life insurance. Health insurance 
plays only a minor part due to the existence of the statutory 
health insurance. Only 7 % of the German population are covered by 
private health insurance. Therefore, private health insurance is 
very much dependent on the rules, developments and reforms of 
statutory sickness funds.
Table 1 Private Insurance in Germany
Gross Revenues
1960 1987
total (in million DM) 
life insurance (in %) 
health insurance (in %) 








































































































life insurance 102 115
health insurance 101 54
indemnity insurance 350 338
reinsurance 34 35
branches of foreign companies 48 108
Source: Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft 
(1988), Table 1.
The data in table 1 also shows that the share of the three types 
of insurances remained relatively stable over a long period of 
time. The market share of life insurance,for instance, droped only 
by 2.2 % over 27 years. This phenomenon is most characteristic for 
highly regulated markets. Structures are conserved and maintain 
over long periods of time.
Currently 542 companies operate in Germany and 108 foreign 
companies have a branch in Germany. The number of branches of 
foreign companies has more than doubled during the last 25 years, 
but the number is still relatively low due to the entry 
restictions imposed by the German insurance regulatory agency 
(Bundesversicherungsaufsichtsamt, Berlin).
Table 2 presents a more detailed overview of the current market 
share of foreign companies operating in Germany. From 1975 to 1986 
the market share of foreign insurers increased only by about 1 
percent point. With less than 13 percent the influence of foreign 
companies on the structure of the German insurance market is 




























































































harmonization of European markets and national insurance 
regulation law is realised in 1992.











Source: Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft 
(1988), Table 8.
In Germany only three firm types of insurance companies exist 
because other forms are not in line with the insurance law.
Mutuals and public enterprises are the traditional forms for 
insurance companies. Usually public enterprises only make business 
in a certain region and are bodies of public law. Their 
traditional task is fire-insurance and insurance for farmers, so 
that they have their natural domain in rural areas. But nowadays 
they sell all kinds of insurance contracts and have certain 
competitive advantages due to local monopolies in fire insurance, 
which is said to be a key-insurance. More than half of the total 




































































































number 256 378 26 110
market
share
58.7 26.7 10.8 3.8
Note: without social insurance, including 121 small mutuals not
listed in Table 1.
Source: Gesamtverband der deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft 
(1988), Table 7.
As mentioned above, the insurance industry is a rapidly growing 
sector. This is also indicated by Table 4 representing some 
income-elasticity estimations for the life and non-life insurance 
demand.
Table 4 Income-Elasticity of Demand
Germany USA
life insurance 1.62 0.75
non-life insurance 1.23 1.39
total 1.37 1.04
Germany: own calculations, USA: Kohler (1982), p. 102.
The income-elasticity for life insurance is much higher in Germany 
than in the US. The reason might be the very comprehensive German 
social security system, which covers most people and promises high 



























































































buy life insurance as a mean for provision for one's retirement.
In Germany life insurance is seen as one form of saving or wealth 
formation and this is only done by higher income classes. Here 
again it becomes obvious that an analysis of insurance markets has 
also to take into account the effects of social security and 
social insurance programms.
To sum up, the major regulatory constraints for insurance markets 
in Germany are threefold: Firstly, the coverage of many risks by 
social insurance (i.e. sickness funds, pension funds accident and 
unemployment insurance). Secondly, the existence of public 
insurance companies with privileges (i.e. monopoly power in some 
markets). Thirdly, the insurance regulation law and the insurance 
regulation agencies. Taking these aspects into account and 
including social insurers we receive a picture of the structure of 
insurance markets in Germany as it is provided by Table 5. In the 
following we will only concentrate on the competetive insurance 
markets, knowinng that most of the risks are covered by social 
insurers and companies holding a monopoly on certain markets is 
granted by law.





demand bodies of private 
public law




282 bill. DM 24 bill. DM
voluntary 2 bill. DM 68 bill. DM
11 %




























































































II. Insurance Market Regulation
Many intruments are employed in Germany to control the different 
lines of insurance2 . Before we analyse the special regulatory 
measures in the automobile and life-insurance market we will 
describe the regulatory framework common to all lines of insurance 
business. Insurance markets are exepted from the rules set in the 
Anti-Trust-Law, which is controlled by the German Anti-Trust- 
Office (Bundeskartellamt:). Like in most other countries the 
reinsurance business is not subject of insurance market 
regulation. Normal insurance companies must obtain a license by 
the regulatory agency. They have to submit a proposal for the 
business they plan to undertake and have to meet certain minimum 
capital requirements. The business plan submitted to the 
regulatory has to contain estimations on the revenues, premiums, 
administrative cost and the risks passed to reinsurers.
But also insurers already operating have to update their business 
plan and have to provide those information required by the 
regulatory agency. All these regulations are justified by the need 
for consumer protection. In addition, companies receive only a 
license for certain lines and may not sell together life 
insurance, liability insurance, health insurance, credit insurance 
and/or legal suit insurance. The specialisation of insurance 
companies forced by law should prevent cross-subsidiation.
All these regulations certainly increase prices because they are 
barriers to entry and administrative cost. In addition, these 
regulations cause inflexibility, a smaller variety of insurance 
policies and a lack of innovation.
In automobile insurance the insurers association and the 
regulatory agency developed a risk class and tariff structure 
which has to be employed by all insurers. The third party 
liability insurance tariff is based on four criteria: The 
horsepower of a car, the residence county, the profession of the
2 See for a detailed description of the history of German 




























































































owner and the number of accident free years of driving. Eleven 
horsepower classes are employed. The German counties are 
categorised in six regional risk classes and farmers and public 
employees get a discount compared to all other insurees. In 
addition, a uniform bonus-malus scheme is employed to control the 
accident free driving.
The uniform tariff system has some advantage for the consumer. He 
or she has to compare only one tariff of all companies offering 
automobile insurance because all companies have to employ the same 
relative value premium scale.
Unfortunately, many consumers believe that all companies offer 
automobile insurance for the same price due to the premium 
regulations. This, however, can be a very costly mistake.
The solvency rules require the insurance companies to hold 
"sufficient" levels of financial reserves. These price and sovency 
regulations are joint by a premium and profit control. The 
regulatory agency imposes strict guidelines for premium 
calculation. The premiums are mark-up prices taking into account 
careful ex ante projects of the administrative cost and claim 
payments. The insurer has to calculate a three per cent profit on 
total premiums earned. If ex post profit exceeds the three per 
cent level the insurer has to grant a refund to its insurees. 
Therefore, refund became a mayor marketing tool for automobile 
insurers.
To sum up, the automobile insurance market is characterised by 
four types of regulation: licensing requirements, risk class 
classifications, price regulations and profit regulations. These 
regulations give some incentives to companies to increase their 
administrative cost because this is the only way they can increase 
their maximum profit.
In principle the same tough regulatory measures are imposed for 
life insurances. In addition, the tax law favours l_ife insurance 




























































































income. Life insurers are not allowed to retain more than ten per 
cent of the capital earnings as profit. If the surplus exceeds ten 
per cent they have to increase the life insurance benefits.
Because the regulatory agency reguires that premiums are 
calculated on the basis that capital interest is only three and a 
half per cent all life insurers realise high surplus. Therefore, 
the actual benefits are always higher than the contracted ones. As 
a conseguence, no risk is left for the insurer.
III. Economic Aspects of Insurance Market Regulation
In this paper we will not repeat the general economic arguments 
for and against insurance market regulation because they can be 
found easily somewhere else3  4. For an economist it is clear that 
German insurance markets are too much regulated and that the cost 
of regulation have to be borne by the consumer.
In this chapter another aspect will be discussed and added to the 
deregulation debate. Insurance market regulations are justified by 
special consumer ignorance in these markets. We will argue that 
regulations probably increase consumer ignorance and therefore 
cause further regulations.
In automobile insurance, life insurance and health insurance the 
regulation leads to a standardization of insurance contracts. For 
instance, the insurance contracts for automobile liability 
insurance are the same for all German insurance companies. One 
would expect that such a strong regulation would lead to uniform 
prices. This is not the case. Prices vary to a large extend from 
company to company.
In a recent study* these price dispersion on the market for 
automobile liability insurance has been analysed. The crucial 
question is how those price-differences can be maintained although
3 See for instance Schulenburg (1984, 1987a), Finsinger/Pauly 
(1986), Eggenstedt (1987) and Farny (1988).




























































































the product is standardized by law. The study is based on a survey 
of 1545 randomly selected automobile owners in Germany. The 
analysis has two mayor results. Firstly, consumers are very badly 
informed about the prices on the automobile insurance markets.
32.9 per cent did not know that there are price differences among 
different companies. Some of those interviewed consumers answered 
that they believe the insurance market regulation takes care for 
uniform prices. The survey suggests that insurance market 
regulation has not increased consumer information but has 
decreased it. Secondly, price dispersion can be partly explained 
by quality differences and differences in the goodwill of 
different companies.
To receive a better insight of consumer information in the 
automobile insurance market, the interviewed were asked to 
classify their insurance company into five catagories. Table 6 
compares the objective classification of the insurance companies 
with the subjective classification by the consumers.
59 persons of the 851 who have tried to classify the relative 
price of their own insurance company think that they have chosen a 
cheap or very cheap insurer but have indead chosen an expensive 
one. On the other hand a fair number of persons believe that they 
have bought expensive insurance coverage but really contracted 
with a relatively cheap company. Only for those listed in the 





























































































Table 6 Price Information on the Automobile
Liability Insurance Market
Subjective and Objective Classification 
of Insurance Premiums
Source: Finsinger/Schulenburg (1987), p. 245.
From the information provided in Table 6 it is easy to develop for 
each person an information indes. For instance, by employing the 
equation q = 4 - Wurzel (i - j)2 . If q = 4 the person belongs to 
the group of people who are located in the diagonal. If q = 0 the 
person is badly informed, but still better informed than those 
32.9 % who did not know that price differences exist at all. We 
will call someone an informed person if q is 3 or 4 and an 
uninformed person if q is less than 3. Taking this index (defined 



























































































influence of socio-economic factors on consumer's information. 
Table 7 contains the estimates of a Probit-regression. Age and 
income were taken as independent variables. In addition, three 
dummies control for education (high-school-degree = 1, otherwise = 
0), sex (male = 1, female = 0) and member of an automobile club 
(= 1, otherwise = 0). Obviously the prototype of a well-informed 
person is a young educated male member of an automobile-club. The 
income has no significant influence on the information level.












Automobile-Club Membership-Dummy 0. 949*
<11 .067)
Probit-analysis with information index equal 1 if q >= 3 and equal 
0 if q < 3; asymptotic t-rations in parenthesis; * = significant 
at a 95 % level; n = 1351
Source: Finsinger/Schulenburg (1987), p. 252.
The positive influence of higher education on the price 
information level could be expected. Women rely much more on the 
advices of their spouses and of insurance agents. They give much 
more credit to companies with a well-known name. The automobile 
club journals publish from time to time comparative price lists 




























































































lower information cost. The insignificant coefficient of income is 
plausible because at least two conflicting hypotheses for the 
relationship between income and information level can be found. An 
efficient use of time leads to higher income. People who work more 
efficiently are perhaps also more efficient in collecting and 
ordering information. But the opportunity cost for the time needed 
to gather information is high for people with a higher working 
income.
Now we will focus on the second explanation for price differences, 
namely quality differences.
Table 8 shows regression results for 33 German automobile insurers 
relating the prices for liability insurance and quality- 
indicators. There is a negative but partly not significant 
correlation between consumer satisfaction found by the inquiry 
mentioned above and the price for automobile insurance coverage. 
Consumers are more likely to be dissatisfied if their insurance is 
relatively expensive. An insurance company can try to build up 
goodwill by reimbursing a high percentage of claims. The consumer 
is willing to pay a higher price for a company with a good 




























































































Table 8 Price for Automobile Liability Insurance
and Quality-Indicators
Intercept 6.4 4* 
(118.06)
Satisfaction with consultation 
for signing a contract
-4.40*
(-3.32)




Number of weeks till claims are reimbursed 0.037
(0.67)
Percentage of claims which are reimbursed 0.14*
(3.27)
Marketing by representatives (dummy) 2.6*
(3.27)
OLS-regression; Rz = 0.63; t-ratios in parenthesis; 
* = significant at a 95 % level; n = 33.
Source: Finsinger/Griine-Henze/Schulenburg (1987), p.673.
There is some evidence that the current regulation leads to lower 
information and higher price level. This and the impossibility to 
sell other than standardized services gives an incentive to 
companies to increase their marketing efforts beyond an optimal 
level. They are in addition encouraged by the observation, that an 
expensive representative network is honoured by higher 
willingness-to-pay. Therefore, it is not surprising that companies 
which sell their insurance contracts by representatives have 




























































































IV. The European Challenge
Although Germany has experienced an intense discussion on the need 
of deregulating the insurance industry5 , almost none deregulatory 
measures have been taken yet.
However, it is most likely that the harmonization of the European 
Market will increase the pressure on the German administration to 
withdraw some regulations for insurance. The European Treaty of 
March 25, 1957 requires, that every citizen of the European 
Community has the right to settle down in each member country and 
to buy services from all companies located in one of the countries 
of the European Community. Along these lines the European High 
Court has decided on December 4, 1986 that the German restrictions 
for foreign insurance companies to set up business in Germany is 
in contradiction to Article 59 of the European Treaty. Therefore, 
the German insurance regulatory agency has to change the licensing 
procedure for foreign companies. Nowadays insurance companies 
selling industry insurance have only to register at the regulatory 
agency, but they do not need a formal license. The European High 
Court decided, however, that a national license requirement is in 
line with the European Treaty if insurance contracts are sold to 
private households. Therefore, the insurance market regulatory 
agency still demands the formal and complicated licensing 
procedure for foreign insurance companies offering insurance 
contracts to private households. In Germany it is currently hotly 
debated if insurance brokers and representatives of insurance 
companies from other countries of the European Economic Community 
should be allowed to sell insurance contracts in Germany. The 
German regulatory agency still argues against such a liberation of 
insurance markets by quoting the need for consumer protection.
However, the integration of international markets and the further 
development of the European Community will force a deregulation of 
German insurance markets. Those German companies which are not 
prepared for the challange of more and tougher price and quality 
competition will have a hard time. But German companies already
5 See Finsinger (1983), Moller (1985), Eggerstedt (1987) and




























































































prepare themselves by opening foreign branches, buying foreign 
companies, cooperating with banks and other financial agencies, 
inventing new types of insurance contracts and learning how to act 
under free price competition. With capital endowments of more than 
560 billion DM and an annual increase of these endowments by 10.7 
per cent during the past few years the German insurance industry 
is well prepared to meet even harder times without being protected 
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